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Abstract
This paper provides the foundations of a uni-
fied cognitive decision-making framework (QulBIT)
which is derived from quantum theory. The main
advantage of this framework is that it can cater
for paradoxical and irrational human decision mak-
ing. Although quantum approaches for cognition
have demonstrated advantages over classical prob-
abilistic approaches and bounded rationality mod-
els, they still lack explanatory power. To address
this, we introduce a novel explanatory analysis of
the decision-maker’s belief space. This is achieved
by exploiting quantum interference effects as a way
of both quantifying and explaining the decision-
makers uncertainty. We detail the main modules
of the unified framework, the explanatory analy-
sis method, and illustrate their application in situ-
ations violating the Sure Thing Principle.
Keywords: QuLBIT; quantum cognition; quantum-
like Bayesian networks; quantum-like influence di-
agrams; bounded rationality; explanatory analysis
Introduction
The primary motivation behind QuLBIT1 is the
challenge to formally account for seemingly para-
doxical human decision making. It is widely known
in the literature of cognitive science and economics
that when it comes to decision-making under un-
certainty, humans usually make decisions that are
inconsistent with the axioms of expected utility
theory, leading to decisions that are either sub-
optimal, paradoxical or even irrational (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; Aerts et al., 2017). These paradox-
ical decisions can result in cognitive biases (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974), violations of major economic
principles (like the Sure Thing Principle) (Savage,
1954; Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961) or violations to
the laws of probability theory and logic (Busemeyer
et al., 2006; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009). In short,
decades of research has found a whole range of hu-
man judgements that deviates substantially from
1https://github.com/catarina-moreira/QuLBiT
what would be considered normatively correct ac-
cording to logic or probability theory.
The field of Quantum Cognition emerged to re-
spond to this challenge, a major feature being the
use of quantum probability theory to model hu-
man cognition, including decision making (Buse-
meyer & Bruza, 2012). Quantum probability can
be viewed as generalisation of Bayesian probability
theory. In quantum-like cognitive models, events
are modelled as sub-spaces of a Hilbert spaces,
a vector space of complex numbers (amplitudes)
which enables the calculation of probabilities by
projection: performing the squared magnitude of
an amplitude. This representation allows events
to interfere with each other, which influences their
associated probabilities. These interference effects
generate a set of new parameters that can be used
to either accommodate violations in Bayesian the-
ory (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012) or paradoxical hu-
man decisions Kahneman et al. (1982). Interference
is a core concept in the QuLBIT framework which
enables an alternative quantification of uncertainty,
as well as the representation of conflicting, ambigu-
ous beliefs. The vector representation of superposi-
tion obeys neither the distributive axiom of Boolean
logic nor the law of total probability (Moreira &
Wichert, 2016b) (See Figure 1).
Quantum cognitive models make use of addi-
tional parameters, which allows fitting to empir-
ical data but which “do not necessarily explain
them” (Blutner & beim Graben, 2016). QuLBIT
addresses this lack of explanatory power by em-
ploying a novel analysis method which allows in-
terpretation of the decision-maker’s belief space,
e.g., when a decision-maker prefers one choice over
another. This paper illustrates QuLBIT’s novel ex-
planatory analysis method in regard to violations of
the Sure Thing Principle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game (Shafir & Tversky, 1992).
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Figure 1: The representation of the decision-maker’s beliefs under uncertainty where beliefs can enter into
a superposition and suffer non-linear quantum interference effects that can destroy or reinforce certain
beliefs in a single time step, leading to decisions that deviate from classical theory.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and
Violations to the Sure Thing Principle
Several experiments in the literature have shown
that people violate this principle in decisions un-
der uncertainty, leading to paradoxical results and
violations of the law of total probability (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1974; Aerts et al., 2004; Birn-
baum, 2008; Li & Taplin, 2002; Hristova & Grin-
berg, 2008). The prisoner’s dilemma is an example
where, under uncertainty, people violate the sure
thing principle, by being more cooperative.
To test the veracity of the Sure Thing Principle
under the Prisoners Dilemma game, experiments
were made in where three conditions were tested:
• Participants were informed the other participant
chose to Defect (Condition 1: Known to defect);
• Participants were informed the other participant
chose to Cooperate (Condition 2: Known to coop-
erate);
• Participants had no information about the other
participants decision (Condition 3 : Unknown).
Condition Pr( P2 = Defect)
Condition 1 (P1 Known to Defect): 0.97
Condition 2 (P1 Known to Cooperate) : 0.84
Condition 3: (P1 Unknown) 0.63
Table 1: Experimental results from Shafir &
Tversky (1992) PD experiment.
Table 1 summarizes the results of these experi-
ments for the three conditions. The column clas-
sical prediction shows the classical probability of a
player choosing to Def ect, given that the decision
of Player 1 is unknown (Condition 3). The payoff
matrix used in Shafir & Tversky (1992) Prisoner’s
Dilemma experiment can be found in Table 2.
P2 = Def P2 = Coop
P1 = Def 30 25
P1 = Coop 85 36
Table 2: Payoffmatrix used in Shafir & Tversky
(1992) Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment.
QuLBIT: Quantum-Like Bayesian
Inference Technologies
The QuLBIT framework provides a unifying deci-
sion model for cognitive decision making, which
is susceptible to cognitive biases. In addition, the
framework caters for data-driven computational
decisions, which are based on optimization algo-
rithms. The main advantage of this framework is
that it can cater for paradoxical and irrational hu-
man decisions during the inference process. This
not only enhances the understanding of cognitive
decision-making, but is also relevant for providing
effective decision support systems. The nature of
the quantum-like approach allows the system to
capture optimal, sub-optimal (bounded rational),
or even irrational decisions which play an impor-
tant role in a “humanistic system”, which are sys-
tems strongly influenced by human judgment, and
behaviour.
Views on Rationality
The QuLBIT framework caters for a spectrum of
views in relation to rational decision making, de-
pending on the degrees of rationality that the
decision-maker employs. The views presented un-
der the proposed quantum-like approach are simi-
lar to the ones put forward by Gigerenzer & Gold-
stein (1996) and Lieder & Griffiths (2020). They in-
clude decisions bounded in terms of time, process-
ing power, information, etc. We extend this view to
incorporate the notion of the irrational mind, a point
2
in the decision-maker’s belief space where heuris-
tics are no longer sufficient to produce satisficing
outcomes. Figure 2 illustrates the different views
on rationality that are represented in the QuLBIT
framework depicted in terms of a non-linear quan-
tum interference wave. We define these views in
the following way:
• Belief space: Corresponds to the set of pos-
sible beliefs that are held by a decision-maker
from the moment that (s)he is faced with a deci-
sion until (s)he actually makes the decision. Be-
liefs as inputs of thought, and desires as mo-
tivational sources of reasoning, guide decision-
making (Cushman, 2019).
• Unbounded Rationality: Corresponds to the
ideal scenario where the decision-maker has un-
limited cognitive resources: time, processing
power and information in order to transact the
decision. Note that the ideal scenario is often not
within reach for a human decision-maker.
• Bounded Rationality: Corresponds to the sce-
nario where the decision-maker makes decisions
bounded in terms of cognitive resources with
limited information, time, and processing power.
Consequently, fast and frugal heuristics are ap-
plied sometimes resulting in sub-optimal deci-
sions (Kahneman et al., 1982), but also yielding
good-enough adaptive decisions (Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2019; Spiliopoulos & Hertwig, 2020),
i.e. favourable in terms of meeting desires sat-
isfactorily without creating illogical or improb-
able conclusions. Fast and frugal heuristics, by
their definition, are not produced by strictly log-
ical or probabilistic calculations, but equally they
do not violate logical or probabilistic principles.
• Resource Rationality: Corresponds to bounded
rationality in the decision-maker’s belief space
that lead to the maximum performance for a
given level of uncertainty Lieder & Griffiths
(2020).
• Irrationality: Corresponds to the situation
where bounded rationality can no longer apply
fast and frugal heuristics that satisfy the desires
due to extreme levels of uncertainty or due to the
inability of the decision-maker to make adequate
decisions. These decisions generally have poor
utility and performances. The fast and frugal
heuristics start to fail, and the decision-maker ex-
periences cognitive dissonance effects and starts
to violate rules of logic and probability, which in
turn leads to unfavourable heuristics and their
paradoxical and irrational outcomes. These deci-
sions are hard (or even impossible) to be captured
by current computational decision systems.
Figure 2: Wave-like interpretation of the QuLBIT
framework in terms of the notions of rationality.
Quantum-Like Bayesian Networks
The fundamental core of the QuLBIT framework
is the notion of graphical probabilistic inference
using the formalism of quantum theory. The
Quantum-like Bayesian network, originally pro-
posed in Moreira & Wichert (2014, 2016a) is the
fundamental building block of the QuLBIT frame-
work and is also an example of a model that
has been extensively studies in the literature for
predicting and accommodating paradoxical hu-
man decisions across different decision scenarios,
ranging from psychological experiments (Moreira
& Wichert, 2016a, 2017; Wichert et al., 2020) to
real-world credit application scenarios (Moreira
et al., 2018). The difference between the tradi-
tional Bayesian network (BN) and a quantum-like
Bayesian Network (QLBN) is the way one speci-
fies the values of the conditional probability ta-
bles. While in the traditional BNs, one uses real
numbers to express probabilities, in quantum me-
chanics these probabilities are expressed as proba-
bility amplitudes, which are represented by com-
plex numbers. Figure 3 shows a representation of a
Quantum-Like Bayesian Network.
Exact inference in QLBNs is given by three steps:
• Definition of the superposition state. In quan-
tum theory, all individual quantum states con-
tained in a Hilbert Space are defined by a super-
position state which is represented by a quantum
state vector |S〉 comprising the occurrence of all
events of the system. This can be analogous to the
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Figure 3: Representation of Shafir & Tversky
(1992) PD experiment using a quantum-like BN
(left) and a classical BN.
classical full joint probability distribution, with
the difference that instead of using real numbers
to express probabilities, one uses complex proba-
bility amplitudes. For example, for Shafir & Tver-
sky (1992) PD experiment, the full joint distri-
bution and the corresponding superposition state
can be represented by the following vectors:
Joint =

0.485
0.015
0.420
0.080
 S =

√
0.485 eiθ1√
0.015 eiθ2√
0.420 eiθ3√
0.080 eiθ4

• A density matrix which describes the quantum
system. The density operator, ρ, aims to describe
a system where we can compute the probabilities
of finding each state in the network. One way to
achieve this is by computing a density operator
through the product between the superposition
state S and the corresponding conjugate trans-
pose S†, that is ρ = SS†.
Figure 4: Density matrix, ρ = SS†
The density operator also contains quantum in-
terference terms in the off-diagonal elements,
which are the core of this model. It is precisely
through these off-diagonal elements that, during
the inference process, one is able to obtain quan-
tum interference effects, and consequently, devi-
ations from normative probabilistic inferences.
• Quantum-Like Marginal Distribution. The
quantum-like marginal probability can be de-
fined by two selection operators Def and Coop,
which are vectors that select the entries of the
classical joint distribution that match the query.
Def =

1
0
1
0
 Coop =

0
1
0
1

Computing the quantum-like probability of
Player 2 defecting, given that (s)he is uncertain
about Player 1’s strategy, P rq(P 2 = Def ), corre-
sponds to summing out all entries of the joint re-
lated to Player 1’s strategy. This probability can
be computed by applying the selection operator
to the density matrix, ρ, and normalising the re-
sults with a normalisation factor γ = 1/(P rq(P 2 =
Def ) + P rq(P 2 = Coop), and where Def T is the
transpose of operator Def ,
P rq(P 2 =Def ) = γ |Def ρDef T | =
= γ |0.905 + 2× 0.451331cos(θDef )
(1)
This is the same as having the classical probabil-
ity, P r(P 2 =Def ), together with a quantum inter-
ference term, InterfDef , which corresponds to the
emergence of destructive / constructive interfer-
ence effects, associated with the uncertainty that
the player is experiencing,
P rq(P 2 =Def ) = γ |P r(P 2 =Def ) + 2InterfDef | =
γ |0.905 + 2× 0.451331cos(θDef )|
(2)
In the same way, we can compute the probability
of Player 2 cooperating, P rq(P 2 = Coop),
P rq(P 2 = Coop) = γ |CoopρCoopT | =
= γ |0.095 + 2× 0.034641cos(θCoop)
(3)
This suggests that the proposed model provides
a hierarchy of mental representations ranging
from quantum-like effects to pure classical ones.
Note that if one sets θDef or θCoop to pi/2, then
cos(θDef ) = 0 and cos(θCoop) = 0. This means that4
the interference term is canceled and the quantum-
like Bayesian network collapses to its classical
counterpart. Setting θDef = θCoop = 2.8057, will
reproduce the disjuction effect observed in Shafir
& Tversky (1992), P rq(P 2 = Def ) = 0.63. In Mor-
eira & Wichert (2016a); Andreas Wichert & Bruza
(2020), the authors proposed a similarity heuristic
and later a law of balance that are able to auto-
matically find the values of θDef and θCoop without
manually fitting the data.
Quantum-Like Influence Diagrams
Quantum-Like Influence diagrams (Moreira &
Wichert, 2018) are a directed acyclic graph struc-
ture that represents a full probabilistic description
of a decision problem by using probabilistic in-
ferences performed in quantum-like Bayesian net-
works together with an utility function.
Given a set of possible decision rules, δA, a clas-
sical Influence Diagram computes the decision rule
that leads to the Maximum Expected Utility in re-
lation to decision D. In a classical setting, this for-
mula makes use of a full joint probability distribu-
tion, P rδA(x|a), over all possible outcomes, x, given
different actions a belonging to the decision rules
δA where the goal is to choose some action a that
maximises the expected utility with respect to some
decision rule, δA.
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
x,a
P rδA (x,a)U (x,a) . (4)
The quantum-like approach of the influence di-
agrams consists in replacing the classical proba-
bility, P rδA, by its quantum counterpart, P rqδA.
The general idea is to take advantage of the quan-
tum interference terms produced in the quantum-
like Bayesian network to influence the probabilities
used to compute the expected utility.
Mathematically, one can define utility opera-
tors, UDef and UCoop, that represent the payoff
that Player 2 receives if (s)he chooses to Def ect
and to Cooperate, respectively. And the quantum-
like influence diagram simply consists in replac-
ing the classical probability P rδA(x,a) in Equation
4, by the probability computed by the quantum-
like Bayesian network P rqδD (x|a). Details of these
formalisms can be found in the publicly available
notebook2 and Moreira & Wichert (2018).
2https://git.io/JfKKB
UDef =

30 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 85 0
0 0 0 0
UCoop =

0 0 0 0
0 25 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 36

The expected utility of Player 2 defecting be-
comes
EUq
[
D
[
δDef
]]
=
∑
x,def
P rδDef (x,def )U (x,def ) (5)
EUq [P 2 =Def ] = T race
[
P rq(P 2 =Def )UDef
]
(6)
EUq [P 2 =Def ] =
115cos(θDef ) + 115.02
0.131cos(θCoop + cos(θDef ) + 1.132
(7)
In the same way, the expected utility of Player 2 co-
operating becomes
EUq [P 2 = Coop] = T race
[
P rq(P 2 = Coop)UCoop
]
=
100cos(θCoop) + 137.121
cos(θCoop) + 13.0288cos(θDef ) + 14.4338
(8)
From this formalism, the region of the belief
space where the decision-maker will always per-
ceive that (s)he will have a higher utility for cooper-
ating, EUq [P 2 = Coop] = X > X = EUq [P 2 =Def ],
is given by θDef = pi, and 0 ≥ θCoop ≤ 2pi.
A Novel Explanatory Analysis in
Quantum-Like Decision Models
In the QuLBIT framework, for decisions under
uncertainty, the decision-maker’s beliefs are rep-
resented as waves during the reasoning process.
Only when the decision-maker makes a deci-
sion, these beliefs collapse to the chosen deci-
sion with a certain probability and utility. Be-
fore reaching a decision, the decision-maker can
experience uncertainty regarding Player 1’s ac-
tions. This corresponds to beliefs of cooperate
and def ect competing with each other causing con-
structive/destructive interferences (quantum inter-
ference parameters θDef and θCoop).
Figure 5 (right) shows the combined graphi-
cal representations of the utilities that a player
can obtain when reasoning about considering a
Def ect strategy (Equations 7) or a Cooperate strat-
egy (Equation 8) according to the uncertainty that
(s)he feels about Player 1’s actions.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the quantum interference waves in the decision-maker’s belief space for Shafir &
Tversky (1992) PD experiment.
It follows from Figure 5 (right) that this model al-
lows different levels of representations of decisions
under uncertainty ranging from (1) fully ratio-
nal and optimal decisions (fully classical), (2) sub-
optimal decisions, to (3) irrational decisions (Shafir
& Tversky, 1992) (fully quantum). Figures 5 (left)
and Figures 5 (center) show the evolution of the
decision-maker’s beliefs through the belief space
enabling a novel analysis and interpretation of the
quantum interference waves in terms of the differ-
ent levels of rationality.
• Fully classical decisions: the majority of the
decision-makers are stable in the regions of the
belief space where the MEU of defect is max-
imised. This notion is in accordance with predic-
tions from expected utility theory and concepts
from Game Theory, where in strictly dominant
strategies, the decision-maker stays stable in the
Nash equilibrium state, in this case, engaging in
a defect strategy. In this region, it seems that the
decision-maker is not experiencing much uncer-
tainty, and consequently quantum interference
effects are minimum.
• Sub-Optimal decisions: the lighter regions of
the figure indicate decisions where the MEU
of defecting is close to the MEU of cooper-
ate, MEU (Def ect) ≈ MEU (Cooperate), but still
the decision-maker prefers to defect, because
there are not enough heuristic cues to convince
him/her to switch from defect to cooperate.
Quantum interference effects occur and uncer-
tainty is high, however the quantum interfer-
ence effects are not strong enough to make the
decision-maker change his mind and for that rea-
son (s)he continues to choose according to ex-
pected utility.
• Irrational decisions: correspond to the cen-
tral, blue regions of the Figure 5. In these
regions, uncertainty is maximised and quan-
tum interference effects are significant enough
to make the decision-maker change his mind.
The decision-maker irrationally engages in wish-
ful thinking, or beliefs that are far stretched
from available data on hand. It is in this re-
gion where the decision-maker perceives that
MEU (Cooperate) > MEU (Def ect), and conse-
quently makes a decision that deviates from the
classical notions of the Expected Utility theory.
Notions of game theory actually accept the fact
that the decision-maker might not always obey
to the formalisms of expected utility theory. This
can occur when players did not understand the
rules of the game, or simply because they played
randomly. What game theory notions tell us is
that the decision-maker will not stay stable in
these irrational states (in this case the Cooperate
state), which is in accordance with Figure 5.
Conclusions
It is the purpose of this paper to provide a set of
contributions of quantum-based models applied to
cognition and decision as an alternative mathemat-
ical approach for decision-making in order to better
understand the structure of human behaviour.
The QuLBIT framework is open-source and al-
lows the combination of both Bayesian and non-
Bayesian influences in cognition, where classical
representations provide a better account of data
as individuals gain familiarity, and quantum-like
representations can provide novel predictions and
novel insights about the relevant psychological
principles involved during the decision process.
Our contributions so far show that QuLBIT is
a unified framework for cognition and decision-
making that is able (1) to accommodate and pre-
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dict paradoxical human decisions (namely disjunc-
tion errors), (2) to analyse the belief space of the
decision-maker through quantum interference, (3)
to quantify uncertainty and (4) to provide a non-
linear view on the different levels of rationality,
ranging from fully optimal decisions (classical) to
irrational decisions (quantum-like).
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